The Minor Puzzle about Habitual Processes

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The Minor Puzzle about Habitual Processes

In this section I want to introduce a minor puzzle that follows from distinguishing habitual vs goal-directed processes.

It is a minor puzzle in the sense that we can solve it quite easily. But it is important because the solution reveals something interesting about the dual-process theory of action.

What evidence supports the dual-process theory of instrumental action?

I want to know whether these actions are habitual, and to be able to demonstrate that by replicable observation.

[trick question] Which of these are when are these habitual actions:

winding up your watch;

doing your teeth;

smoking tobacco;

watching TV;

cycling the same route home every day;

taking out your key on getting home;

undressing for bed?

Too hard to do a controlled experiment with such actions. Let’s consider an easier case ...

You see a rat and a lever. The rat presses the lever occasionally. Now you start rewarding the rat: when it presses the lever it is rewarded with a particular kind of food. As a consequence, the rat presses the lever more often.

Is this lever pressing primarily a consequence of habitual processes?

It’s a trick question -- we can’t tell

habitual process

Stimulus is the layout of this room.

Rat (=Agent) is rewarded with food

Room-LeverPress (=Stimulus-Action) Link is strengthened due to reward

Thf LeverPress (=Action) will occur in this room (=Stimulus).

Problem: different hypotheses, same prediction

The ‘latchkey’ refers back to an example from James in the `no habitual actions` section

Why is taking out your latchkey out on arriving at the door-step of a friend likely to be an action dominated by habitual processes?

An action that runs against your stated intentions and desires is unlikely to be explained solely by them.

Can we use the same principle here?

What if we devalue the food in extinction?

Explain devaluation (poison, or satiation)

habitual process

Stimulus is the layout of this room.

Rat (=Agent) is rewarded with food

Room-LeverPress (=Stimulus-Action) Link is strengthened due to reward

Thf LeverPress (=Action) will occur in this room (=Stimulus).

‘goal-directed’ process

Lever pressing (=Action) leads to food (=Outcome).

Thf LeverPress-Food (=Action-Outcome) Link is strong.

Rat (=Agent) has strong positive Preference for food.

Thf LeverPress (=Action) will occur.

Devaluation affects Preference, so changes what the instrumental hypothesis predicts.

Devaluation does not affect the Simulus-Action link. (It’s the fact that food was preferred in the past that matters: because of this, getting food was rewarding and so strengthened the Simulus-Action link.)

What if we devalue the food in extinction?

‘Goal-directed’ process : it will reduce lever pressing (to none)

Habitual process : it will have no effect on lever pressing

‘Mean lever-press rates during the extinction (left-handpanel) and reacquisitiontests(right-handpanel) followingthe devaluation of either the contingent (group D-N) or non-contingentfood (group N-D).’

Dickinson, 1985 figure 3

What if we devalue the food in extinction?

‘Goal-directed’ process : it will reduce lever pressing (to none)

Habitual process : it will have no effect on lever pressing

(a) Rat’s behaviour is dominated by a ‘goal-directed’ process (explained by their Preferences). (b) Hypotheses about processes underpinning decisions are scientifically testable.

‘the laboratory rat fits the teleological [goal-directed] model; performance of this particular instrumental behaviour really does seem to be controlled by knowledge about the relation between the action and the goal’

(Dickinson, 1985, p. 72)

so far ...

1. habitual ≠ habitual

2. We can test whether an action is dominated by habitual or goal-directed processes using devaluation in extinction.

What if we devalue the food in extinction?

‘Goal-directed’ process : it will reduce lever pressing (to none)

Habitual process : it will have no effect on lever pressing

‘the laboratory rat fits the teleological [goal-directed] model; performance of this particular instrumental behaviour really does seem to be controlled byknowledge about the relation between the action and the goal’

(Dickinson, 1985, p. 72)

But there is a complication ...

It is not none!!!

Dickinson, 1985 figure 3

puzzle

If the action is not habitual but controlled by goal-directed processes, why does it still occur after devaluation?

Solution is to stop thinking that actions can be just one or the other. \emph{The instrumental/habitual distinction concerns proceses, not actions!}

What if we devalue the food in extinction?

‘Goal-directed’ process : it will reduce lever pressing (to none)

Habitual process : it will have no effect on lever pressing

‘the laboratory rat fits the teleological [goal-directed] model; performance of this particular instrumental behaviour really does seem to be controlled byknowledge about the relation between the action and the goal’

(Dickinson, 1985, p. 72)

Dickinson, 1985 p. 72

‘we did not conclude that all such responding was of this form.

Indeed, we observed some residual responding during the post-re-valuation test that appeared to be impervious to outcome devaluation and therefore autonomous of the current incentive value,

and we speculated that this responding was habitual’

and established by a process akin to the stimulus-response (S-R)/reinforcement mechanism embodied in Thorndike’s classic Law of Effect (Thorndike, 1911).

(Dickinson, 2016, p. 179)

Dickinson, 2016 p. 179

Dual-Process Theory of Action

some instrumental actions are ‘controlled by two dissociable processes: a goal-directed and an habitual process’

\citep{Dickinson:1985qp,dickinson:2016_instrumental}

Dickinson, 2016 p. 179

one action, two processes

(Strictly speaking, we might think that some actions were habitual and others goal-directed and that only the former remain.)

[explain slowly] This is a causal model. The ‘instrumental action’ labels a variable that represents whether a particular action occurs or not.

Strength of preferences has a direct effect on the goal-directed process. But of course it also has an effect on the habitual process, just less directly (via whether things are rewarding perhaps).

Earlier I asked, You see a rat and a lever. The rat presses the lever occasionally. Now you start rewarding the rat: when it presses the lever it is rewarded with a particular kind of food. As a consequence, the rat presses the lever more often.

Is this lever pressing primarily a consequence of habitual processes?

Probably not most of the time (but some of the time).

[trick question] Which of these are when are these habitual actions:

winding up your watch;

doing your teeth;

smoking tobacco;

watching TV;

cycling the same route home every day;

taking out your key on getting home;

undressing for bed?

Our actions are a consequence of the interweaving of habitual and goal-directed processes.

This is actually what you want. The habitual are simple fast and robust but also quite limited and no good in entirely novel situations. So having a mix of habitual and goal-directed is ideal ... Especially if they both pull you in the same direction.

This has consequences for understanding the extent to which actions can be reasonable, and even for understanding what action itself is.

We find out in the evidence section how plausible it is that habitual processes play a significant role in your life.

so far ...

1. habitual ≠ habitual

2. We can test whether an action is dominated by habitual or goal-directed processes using devaluation in extinction.

3. The dual-process theory of instrumental action (habitual and goal-directed processes both influence an instrumental action)

questions on complications

Hesper asks two questions which nicely illustrate two features of the dual-process theory of instrumental action.

hespercheung [q1]

Is a reflex action caused by a goal-directed process or a habitual process?

PRELIMINARY

Are reflexes instrumental?

‘Reflexes keep us alive. In newborn infants, for example, reflexes are essential for feeding ...

Describe head-turn and sucking reflexes

‘Reflexes keep us alive. In newborn infants, for example, reflexes are essential for feeding. If you touch an infant’s cheek with your finger, the baby will reflexively turn his or her head in that direction, with the result that your finger will fall in the baby’s mouth. This head-turning reflex no doubt evolved to facilitate finding the nipple. Once your finger has fallen in the newborn’s mouth, the baby will begin to suckle. The sensation of an object in the mouth causes reflexive sucking’

(Domjan, 2010, p. 31)

hespercheung [q1]

Is a reflex action caused by a goal-directed process or a habitual process?

Take the flinch reflex as an example. On one hand, even a new born baby will blink her eyes when someone throws a fake punch at her face, so it does not seem to be habitual. But if it is goal-directed, it seems difficult to identify the belief and desire behind the blinking as well.

So, is it possible for an action to be caused by a habitual process without being performed before? If yes, is a reflex action an instance of such?

CAPTION Neural organization of simple reflexes. The environmental stimulus for a reflex activates a sensory neuron, which transmits the sensory message to the spinal cord. Here, the neural impulses are re- layed to an interneuron, which in turn relays the impulses to the motor neuron. The motor neuron activates muscles involved in movement.

NB true story of reflexes is much more complex because brain processses can modulate them.

Domjan (2010, p. figure 2.1)

neither habitual nor goal-directed

So reflexes are instrumental actions which are explained by neither habtiual nor goal-directed processes.

This is an important caveat for the dual-process theory of action.

Question complete

hespercheung [q1]

Is a reflex action caused by a goal-directed process or a habitual process?

So, is it possible for an action to be caused by a habitual process without being performed before? If yes, is a reflex action an instance of such?

hespercheung [q2]

If a person intends to act according to his habit, will his action be caused by a goal-directed or habitual process?

For example, suppose a basketball player desires to score as much as possible, and it is his belief that to score more in this particular game he has to drive in instead of shooting from the outside because his opponents are short. The belief and desire together constitute his intention to drive in to score in the game. With such intention, whenever he can either shoot or drive, all that he is thinking is to go towards the basket, and hence he drives. But when he is driving in, every bit of detail of his bodily movement is habitual, which means that he is not thinking about any of them in particular, thanks to his years of training experiences.[...]

In this case, is the action, which is his drive, caused by a goal-directed or a habitual process, or can it be both?

Actions are composed of actions.

Illustration: changing a nappy ...

hespercheung [q2]

If a person intends to act according to his habit, will his action be caused by a goal-directed or habitual process?

In this case, is the action, which is his drive, caused by a goal-directed or a habitual process, or can it be both?

Further complications:

1. intentionally acquired habits (coming later)

2. role of habitual processes in reasoning (Keramati, Smittenaar, Dolan, & Dayan, 2016)

So we should not understand the dual-process theory as excluding the possibility that goal-directed and habitual processes combine in complex ways.

For methodological reasons, we are mainly interested in cases where they conflict. But the point of having both is in large part that they can complement each other, not fight.

significance

quick first pass

I want to illuminate where we’re with all this going. But we will cover this in lots of detail later.

The dual-process theory creates problems for lots of philosophical ideas: the Simple Picture, the Causal Theory of Action, and the Standard Solution to the Problem of Action

The dual-process theory of instrumental action has consequences for the simple picture.

When you act,

there are reasons why you act;

you know the reasons;

you act because you know the reasons; and

the reasons justify your action. make your action intelligible.

It seems that knowledge is reasons is irrelevant for habitual case. Further, it seems that if you ask people about reasons, their answers are not likely to carry any special first-person authority when their actions are controlled by habitual processes.

They have to figure out the reasons for their actions in just the same way as an observer would.

It seems that your knowledge of reasons is irrelevant to whether and why the action happens.

possible responses

∞tip: always consider responses

1. insist that there is knowledge of reasons even when habitual processes dominate actions

2. argue that what habitual processes dominate are not actions

3. zahidnasser’s idea (there is always an intention) ...

I will come to this in a mo.

the dual-process theory is also a problem for the Causal Theory of Action ...

Causal Theory of Action: an event is action ‘just in case it has a certain sort of psychological cause’ (Bach, 1978, p. 361).

Psychological causes of action are is a matter for discovery.

(You can’t combine these if you think that what you are discovering is not what actions are but only what their causes are. But, yes, there are ways of deflating the impression that there is an opposition here.)

There is a deep opposition between the Causal Theory of Action and the idea that the mechanisms responsible for action are a matter for scientific discovery.

[To see this, ask how you characterize action for the sake of the scientific investigation. Do you already know what actions are before you start? Causal Theory of Action only works with the science if you imagine that scientists are discovering which things are actions; and even then it seems unconstrained (how do you know which psychological causes are causes of actions). But I’m sure there’s a way to make it work.]

This is arguably what is wrong with the Causal Theory of Action.

What distinguishes your actions from things that merely happen to you? (‘The Problem of Action’)

Standard Solution: actions are those events which stand in an appropriate causal relation to an intention.

Objection: some instrumental actions manifestly run counter to the agents’ intentions.

How do we know? From persistence following devaluation!

[ensure term is in glossary on the handout page: extinction]

I will argue about this in a bit more detail later. But for now let’s imagine you are Anscombian rather than Davidsonian. In that case you reject the Standard Solution so don’t really care about this argument ...

Anscombian View

‘What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? [...]

So Anscombe is happy with nonintentional actions. That makes things much easier for her in one way.

they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’ is given application; [...]

the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting.’

‘I was not aware I was doing that’ is a rejection of the question ‘Why?’ whose sense we are trying to get at; [...]

further ‘I knew I was doing that, but only because I observed it’ would also be a rejection of it.’

Anscombe (1957, pp. 9, 14)

There is not an objection to this picture, I think, but there is an interesting quirk which may eventually lead to some objections.

1. where habitual processes dominate, we will sometimes be unaware of acting and our reasons for acting;

2. and, further, when we are aware of them this will often require observation and guesswork.

3. Such cases are therefore not intentional actions, if Anscombe is right.

4. But the existence of such cases is a relatively recent scientific discovery. Further, discovering whether habitual or goal-directed processes dominate requires inference from carefully contrived situations (involving devaluation). There is no first-person marker which reliably distinguishes genuine intentional actions from those where habitual processes dominate.

5. So Anscombe’s view leaves us with the conclusion that agents typically do not know which of their actions are intention and, pre-scientifically, are likely to be overconfident about this.

so far ...

1. habitual ≠ habitual

2. We can test whether an action is dominated by habitual or goal-directed processes using devaluation in extinction.

3. The dual-process theory of instrumental action (habitual and goal-directed processes both influence an instrumental action)

4. This might be useful in generating objections to philosophical views

What I learned about why you are here

Common theme but this one has a smile so I chose it

Let’s talk about a dissertation nearer the time if you’re interested. Yes, good idea.

Are we doing questions this year?

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The Minor Puzzle about Habitual Processes

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