Keyboard Shortcuts?f

×
  • Next step
  • Previous step
  • Skip this slide
  • Previous slide
  • mShow slide thumbnails
  • nShow notes
  • hShow handout latex source
  • NShow talk notes latex source

Click here and press the right key for the next slide.

(This may not work on mobile or ipad. You can try using chrome or firefox, but even that may fail. Sorry.)

also ...

Press the left key to go backwards (or swipe right)

Press n to toggle whether notes are shown (or add '?notes' to the url before the #)

Press m or double tap to slide thumbnails (menu)

Press ? at any time to show the keyboard shortcuts

 

Conclusion to Philosophical Issues in Behavioural Science

conclusion

In conclusion, ...
I am going to start with a 90 second version, and then repeat

To understand why people act, individually and jointly.

Philosophical, psychological and formal answers are—or appear—both mutually dependent and inconsistent.

This is an obstacle to full understanding,
but one that you can overcome.

slower conclusion

challenge

Discover why people act,
individually and jointly.

When you act,

there are reasons why you act;

you know the reasons;

you act because you know the reasons; and

the reasons justify your action. make your action intelligible.

How can we turn this into a theory? Is it true?

This is the basic picture that nearly all philosophers start from in attempting to meet the challenge.
Davidson’s view is a version: answer the Problem of Action by invoking intentions; to intend is to know a reason for your actions.
We can also draw on decision theory in turning the simple picture into a theory (decision theory and game theory are supposed to be elaborations of what it is to be rational). Of course, if we do this we lose the knowledge component.
One difficulty is that any such theory needs to be consistent with discoveries from various behavioural sciences, and that proves to be a large challenge.
Here psychology and other behavioural sciences are also relevant ...
We can draw on them to show that the simple picture is either wrong or else only a very small part of the answer.
Just here there are two ways you can go.
One would be to reject this Simple Picture altogether (as, perhaps, Chater (2018), does in different words).
Another way to go is to embrace the challenge: we need what we do not have, which is a way of making systematic sense of the role of reasons in explaining why people act.
This raises a number of questions. [1] Clearly reasons are not invariably involved. So what distinguishes cases where they are from where they are not? [2] Is the Simple Picture about processes or about something else? [3] Is the Simple Picture merely a gloss on existing scientific theories or does it point to the existence of phenomena that are not yet explained by existing scientific theories?

relevance to essay questions

But that is all big picture ... how to link it to essay questions?

Integration Questions

Identify theories from two or more disciplines
(philosophical, psychological or formal)

which appear to target a single set of phenomena
while saying incompatible things about it ...

1. Are they actually inconsistent? ?

2. If so: how, if at all, should either or both theories be refined?

How many integration questions can you identify from the course?
[1] Standard Answer to the Problem of Action vs the dual-process theory of instrumental action [2] Standard Answer to the Problem of Action vs theories of motor control [3] Decision Theory vs the dual-process theory of instrumental action [4] Bratman’s theory of shared intention vs team reasoning [5] Bratman’s theory of shared intention vs motor representations of collective goals

Standard Solution to The Problem of Action vs the dual-process theory of instrumental action

Standard Solution to The Problem of Action vs theories of motor control

Decision Theory vs the dual-process theory of instrumental action

Bratman’s theory of shared intention vs team reasoning

Bratman’s theory of shared intention vs motor representations of collective goals

intention decision theory habitual vs goal-directed
We always have to know where we are in relation to the triange.

philosophy

What distinguishes actions from things that merely happen to you?

psychology

Which processes are involved in selecting the goals of actions?

Actions are those events which are appropriately related to intentions.

At least two: habitual and goal-directed.

apparent inconsistency

Nothing to say about processes.

Nothing to say about what action is.

apparent mutual dependence

Psychology relies on some understanding of what action is. Without this we have no idea about our subject matter.
Natural to think that philosophy will provide this.
intention decision theory habitual vs goal-directed
Decision Theory vs the dual-process theory of instrumental action
Fewer people got this but I think only because I didn’t explain it clearly enough.
Decision theory is a model. A model says nothing about the world but can be construed in one way or another.
We can construe decision theory as a predictive device, as a normative device or as a an elucidation of the notions of preference and belief.
If we construe decision theory as an elucidation of the notions of preference and belief, then we can only apply it to agents whose actions invariably reflect their preferences and beliefs. (After all, the central idea is that you can extract preferences and beliefs from the choices people make.)
The problem is that the characteristic of habitual processes is that devaluation has no immediate effect on the actions they trigger.
[alt:] The problem is that the dual-process theory of instrumental action shows this: there are situations where (1) the goal-directed process would result in one action; (2) the habitual process would result in another, quite different action; and (3) which process dominates does not depend on your beliefs or desires but on your training history, or on how stressed you are, or on which situation you are in [popcorn: cinema vs work environment] ...
It follows that your actions will not invariably reflect your preferences and beliefs; and so that you have no preferences or beliefs at all.
But this is absurd; and so we cannot construe decision theory as an elucidation of the notions of preference and belief if we also accept the dual-process theory of instrumental action.

Integration Questions

Identify theories from two or more disciplines
(philosophical, psychological or formal)

which appear to target a single set of phenomena
while saying incompatible things about it ...

1. Are they actually inconsistent? ?

2. If so: how, if at all, should either or both theories be refined?

Over to you. (I genuinely do not know, although I will offer some clues at the end of the lecture.)

Integration Questions for Joint Action

shared intention game theory dyadic motor plans
Is there both mutual dependence and inconsistent claims? I am unsure about this.
Yes, they are inconistent. On team reasoning there is no role for shared intention; on shared intention there is no role for team reasoning. And since each attempts to say how joint actions are selected, they cannot be combined.
But are they mutually dependent? (Maybe on Pacherie’s view: one is about fast, uncomplicated cases.)
But in the lectures we skipped over that because there is actually a substantial attempt to unify the two theories. And if unification succeeds, we do not need to worry about whether it was necessary or not.

philosophy

What distinguishes joint actions from things we do in parallel but merely individually?

economics

How can we model rational behaviour in social interactions?

shared intention

game theory team reasoning

Pacherie’s Reconciliation:
‘shared intention lite’

nothing to say about agents without planning abilities

no role for planning abilities

apparent mutual dependence

So this looks to be a case where the Integration Challenge was resolved.
Quick reminder what Pacherie’s theory says, in essence
individual reasoning team reasoning decision decision intention shared intention

Integration Questions

Identify theories from two or more disciplines
(philosophical, psychological or formal)

which appear to target a single set of phenomena
while saying incompatible things about it ...

1. Are they actually inconsistent? ?

2. If so: how, if at all, should either or both theories be refined?

Yes, they are inconistent. On team reasoning there is no role for shared intention; on shared intention there is no role for team reasoning. And since each attempts to say how joint actions are selected, they cannot be combined.
Actually if you remember there might have been an objection (the autonomy challenge). But still, at least we have a candidate here

challenge

Discover why people act,
individually and jointly.

basic theories and discoveries
from three disciplines needed
to answer the question

I always wanted to pure philosophy ... in fact maths and philosophy because I felt stats and mechanics were too applied ... and for a long time I hoped that this would be enough but in talking to scientists I realised that it isn’t

to reach beyond
you need to look beyond

🔑

inconsistencies abound (maybe)

but integration is possible (definitely)

This is the key to the essay questions. In one way or another, you are addressing this question: find significant inconsistencies or consider how integration is possible. (Except for questions about interface problems)