Preference vs Aversion: A Dissociation

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Preference vs Aversion: A Dissociation

∞TODO: too complicated and too long. First have three steps (steps to what?) Then have a second illustration under `Q1: Can your primary motivational states diverge from your preferences?`

Dickinson’s melons example points to the second thing discussed (toxicosis causes aversion but not a cessation of the lever pressing), not the first thing discussed (hunger and desire are independent).

motivational states

primary motivational states

standard assumption

Primary motivational states are locked to preferences.

For example ..

if you are hungry for a food, you desire it; and

if you are averse to a food, you do not desire it.

significance

two motivational systems

When Xenon and I are tied together, there are two motivational systems that often pull in different directions ...

significance

‘a philosophical end: elucidation of the notions of subjective probability and subjective desirability or utility’

(Jeffrey, 1983, p. xi)

What kinds of processes in

individual animals

guide actions?

1. two kinds of process -- habitual vs instrumental ✓

2. two kinds of motivational state -- primary vs preferences

There are at least two kinds of motivational state,
which have distinct roles in explaining behaviour.

background

primary motivational states sometimes influence behaviour

primary motivational states (e.g. hunger) modulate behaviour, and that they do so in fairly complex ways (e.g. how hunger modifies behaviour depends on location)

Almost too obvious to mention---postnatal infant crying when hungry---but you will see why this matters in a moment ...

Shettleworth (1975, p. figure 1)

CAPTION: ‘Hamsters performing some of the action .patterns discussed in the text and defined in Table 1. (Drawn by C. Blinick from photographs by M. Jackson.)’

Shettleworth (1975, p. figure 2)

‘HxE’ means there is a significant interaction of hunger and environment

[More eating when not hungry? I double checked the figure in Shettleworth. That’s what her figure says. I think because in the Hungry condition the hamsters had no access to food.]

This is just to show that primary motivational states (e.g. hunger) modulate behaviour, and that they do so in fairly complex ways (e.g. how hunger modifies behaviour depends on location)

CAPTION: ‘Effects of food deprivation (hunger) on various behaviors in the golden hamster. Hunger does not blindly energize activity, but selects be- haviors from an organized behavior system. (After Shettleworth, 1975.)’

Shettleworth (1975, p. figure 2)

Just the cases where hunger and environment interact.

This shows that hunger’s effect depends on the environment; unlike the postnatal baby crying, the effect of the hamster’s hunger on its behaviour depends on its environment.

‘open field’ was a box made to look a bit like open field.

experiment:

primary motivational states influence
some but not all behaviours

I was trained to press the lever for a novel food,
which I retreived from a magazine.

modified from Callahan and Terry (2015) figure 3

Here you can see the magazine. Rat sticks head in magazine to retrieve the food.

source is completely irrelevant so do not include bibtext

I was trained to press the lever for a novel food,
which I retreived from a magazine.

I was trained while satiated
and I never ate the food when hungry.

After training,
I was tested in extinction.

I was trained to press the lever for a novel food,
which I retreived from a magazine.

I was trained while satiated
and I never ate the food when hungry.

After training,
I was tested in extinction.

redrawn from Balleine (1992, p. figure 1 (part))

crazy, no!? Hunger makes no difference to the lever pressing even tho’ I was trained to press the lever for a novel food.

If you let the rat eat the novel food WHILE HUNGRY, the picture is completely different. Now the hunger does drive the lever pressing.

the different actions tell incompatible stories ...

magazine entry

-> when hungry, does desire the novel food (or drink, Exp 1B)

lever pressing

-> when hungry, does NOT desire it

CHeck you understand

I was trained to press the lever for a novel food,
which I retreived from a magazine.

I never ate the food when hungry.

I never ate the food when satiated.

redrawn from Balleine (1992, p. figure 3)

crazy, no!? Hunger makes no difference to the lever pressing even tho’ I was trained to press the lever for a novel food.

If you let the rat eat the novel food WHILE HUNGRY, the picture is completely different. Now the hunger does drive the lever pressing.

two actions, incompatible stories ...

magazine entry

-> when satiated, does NOT desire the novel food (or drink, Exp 1B)

lever pressing

-> when satiated, does desire it

Are the stories really incompatible? Not if you allow that there are two or more independent motivational systems, primary motivational states and preferences

same data but just the lever presses

redrawn from Balleine (1992, p. figures 1 and 3)

It is possible to
hunger for it but not desire it; and
to desire it but not hunger for it.

There is a complication with this experiment that we will come back to later, but for now I want to move on to be sure we all understand why it is significant.

✓

experiment:

primary motivational states influence
some but not all behaviours

motivational states

primary motivational states

linked to biological needs, can be unlearned

hunger, thirst
satiety
aversion
disgust
...

preferences

changing, influenced by learning (and fashion, ...)

chocolate over rhubarb
lime over lemon
red over blue
...

standard assumption

Primary motivational states are locked to preferences.

For example ..

if you are hungry for a food, you desire it; and

if you are averse to a food, you do not desire it.

two motivational systems

... an interface problem where there are two sets of preferences.

The possibility of divergence in
primary motivational states and preferences
gives rise to interface problem #2

Can you identify the interface problem? (I didn’t say what it is yet.)

Interface problem #2 ...

‘we should search in vain among the literature for a consensus about the psychological processes by which primary motivational states, such as hunger and thirst, regulate simple goal-directed [i.e. instrumental] acts’

(Dickinson & Balleine, 1994, p. 1)

Dickinson & Balleine , 1994 p. 1

This is a very basic question. Why do you go to the kitchen and press the lever to get some water when you are thirsty?

An Interface Problem:

Primary motivational states guide some actions.

Preferences guide some actions.

Pursuing a single goal can involve both kinds of state.

As in the case of lever pressing then magazine entry to get the sugar solution. (Not demonstrated in this talk.)

Primary motivational states can differ from preferences.

later: how to solve that interface problem

now: a complication

complication

It is possible to
hunger for it but not desire it; and
to desire it but not hunger for it.

Background assumption:
magazine entries reveal hunger,
lever presses reveal desire.

complication: Why is this assumption true?

This is a rough-and-ready distinction. I do not think we can get very far with this and I can’t find quite this distinction in textbooks. E.g. Domjan (2010) has ‘elicited behaviours’ but that doesn’t get to this distinction as far as I can see.

But I think the distinction is fine because it’s essentially model-free vs model-based.

action-guiding processes

outcome driven

driven by expectations concerning how likely the action is to bring about an outcome

stimulus driven

driven by the presence of a stimulus

action—outcome

stimulus—action

e.g. lever pressing -> obtain food

includes goal-directed processes

e.g. enticing smell -> salivation

includes reflexes, habitual processes and more

Why are magazine entries and lever pressing different?

1. Primary motivational states directly influence
only stimulus-driven processes.

2. Lever-pressing in these rats is primarily a consequence of outcome-driven processes.

3. Magazine entry is a consequence of ??? 🐀

Since the food is not actually in the magazine, there would *seem* to be no possibility that magazine entry is a consequence of a stimlus-driven process. But ...

conditioning

Pavlovian (classical)

Overshadowing occurs when more than one stimulus is associated with an event: e.g. a light and a tone. The salience of the tone affects how much the animal learns about the correlation between light and event: a salient tone reduces the amount of learning. (31- 32)

Blocking : if an animal has previously learnt about a correlation B -> E2, it is much less likely to learn about a correlation A -> E2 when presented with a situation in which E2 is preceded by A and B. (48)

Why does hunger drive magazine entries and not lever presses?

1. Primary motivational states directly influence
only stimulus-driven processes.

2. Lever-pressing in these rats is primarily a consequence of outcome-driven processes.

3. Magazine entry is a consequence of ??? 🐀stimulus-driven processes.

‘simple anticipatory approach to a food source, such as that involved in magazine entry, is primarily under the control of Pavlovian processes’

Balleine (1992, p. 248)

What exactly are Pavlovian processes? I’m assuming that they are stimulus-driven, not outcome driven.

Recall ...

complication

It is possible to
hunger for it but not desire it; and
to desire it but not hunger for it.

Background assumption:
magazine entries reveal hunger,
lever presses reveal desire.

complication: Why is this assumption true?

conclusion

Philosophical and formal theories of action and joint action
assume a single system in which
belief, desire, intention and the rest
are normatively
and inferentially
integrated.

inferential integration

One instrumental action can involve multiple, dissociable
motivational states
and multiple, dissociable
goal representations (intentions and motor representations).

This gives rise to interface problems.

Could be interim conclusion depending on time

interface problem #1

interface problem #2

What were the interface problems?

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Preference vs Aversion: A Dissociation

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